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EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY IN THE FAMILY:  
FINDINGS FROM A BASIC INCOME EXPERIMENT 
 
This paper investigates how a basic income could transform families and gender power relations 
within them. We draw on Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty framework to argue that a basic 
income can offer a structural foundation for a radical shift towards more equitable family 
relations. This is because a basic income can support couples through economic uncertainty and 
reduce women’s structural vulnerability to economic dependency within marriages that strips 
them of exit and voice. We build our case on novel data from an understudied social experiment 
from the late 1970s called the Manitoba Basic Income Experiment, or Mincome. Using 
difference-in-difference regression with individual fixed-effects, we analyze three types of 
family outcomes: separation, bargaining power, and marital conflict. We find that during 
Mincome unhappy couples became more likely to consider separation, but that separation overall 
did not increase. We also find that Mincome reduced marital conflict associated with financial 
stressors and that some measures of wives’ bargaining power increased. Taken together, our 
results speak in favor of the view that a basic income has the potential to foster more equitable 
family lives.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
How would a basic income impact families and the gendered power dynamics within them? 
Would more couples split up were they not so economically dependent on one another? Would 
gender power asymmetries within couples be redressed if both partners had the means to leave 
the relationship? Would conflict inside relationships diminish if economic security improved? 
The basic income—or, guaranteed annual income (GAI)1—experiments of the 1970s (see 
Munnell 1986; Lewis et al. 2005) provide an opportunity to explore these questions. These 
experiments offered an income allowance to families that was unconditional on work and 
guaranteed a decent standard of living. In doing so, the guaranteed income experiments shifted 
the economic conditions within which individuals made decisions about their family lives. The 
question of how basic income impacts family life is a timely one; basic income is increasingly 
debated in public venues but there is little research available to policy-makers. We return to these 
 
1 Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) and Universal Basic Income (UBI) are terms often used to denote a policy 
design difference: a GAI usually refers to a negative income tax, as was the case with Mincome, and a UBI usually 
refers to a demogrant. Basic income is the umbrella term that encompasses both types of policies. In the 1970s and 
1980s “guaranteed income” was most often used, and today, “basic income” is more common. We use GAI to signal 
the distinctive design applied in the Mincome case and use “basic income” as the broader category. 
  
extraordinarily ambitious but understudied experiments and pose questions about family 
dynamics and the gender power inequalities within them in a fresh light. Despite changes in 
family and economic structures since the 1970s, we argue that lessons from these experiments 
remain important for contemporary cases, in particular as economic uncertainty continues to play 
a major role in family life, and income inequality within couples remains large, especially after 
childbirth (Musick et al. 2020). In this article, we offer a novel framework and hitherto-unused 
empirical evidence to conceptualize the various pathways through which a GAI could shape the 
future of family life.  
The academic literature on the GAI experiments of the 1970s was primarily focused on 
labor market consequences (i.e., will the GAI reduce the labor supply?) and only secondarily 
concerned with family dynamics; but it was the latter that triggered intense public debate and 
sealed the fate of the guaranteed income in North America. The key question that animated the 
American debate was whether the policy would lead women to leave their husbands. Would the 
guaranteed income, in the lingo of the time, “undermine the family”? (Munnell 1986) In the U.S. 
experiments, some researchers purported to find evidence of marital dissolution (Groeneveld et 
al. 1980; Hannan et al. 1977; Tuma and Hannan 1990), while others, using the same data, 
disputed these findings (Cain 1986; Cain and Wissoker 1990a, 1990b). Though the results were 
inconclusive, the first set of findings received a louder public hearing and was arguably (see 
Steiner 1981; Greenberg et al. 2003) an important reason why the movement to implement a 
guaranteed income policy in the United States stalled. In the late 1970s, public debate on the 
question of the “strength of the family” aroused a highly emotional response (see Coyle and 
Wildavsky 1986), leading to energetic recantations by high-profile supporters. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, a liberal senator and early proponent of the guaranteed income, withdrew his support 
in light of the apparent evidence on marital dissolution. In the pages of National Review he wrote 
to William F. Buckley: “But we were wrong about a guaranteed income! Seemingly it is 
calamitous. It increases family dissolution by some 70 percent, decreases work, etc. Such is now 
the state of the science, and it seems to me we are honor bound to abide by it for the moment” 
  
(Moynihan 1978). Conservatives too seized on the findings. George Gilder testified to Congress 
in 1980, declaring that the GAI would mean “millions” of “marriages would be in jeopardy.” 
Both the academic literature and the subsequent popular debate framed the GAI in an 
exceedingly narrow fashion, focusing on the “calamitous” outcome that some marriages might 
break up. 
This article shifts the debate away from the narrow focus on how the GAI could 
“undermine the family,” and instead explores the possibility that the GAI might offer a structural 
foundation for a shift towards more equitable family relations. The old debate seldom 
acknowledged that if some marriages dissolved, perhaps they were bad or abusive marriages, 
formed and sustained in the context of limited alternatives. Likewise, if some marriages were 
stabilized—as some studies found—then perhaps it was because the guaranteed income 
ameliorated underlying stressors. The framing of divorce as calamity prevented scholars from 
examining how the GAI could reshape family relations more broadly - how it could affect not 
only individuals’ decisions to stay in marriages - but also how they feel and relate to one another 
inside them. Our article draws on feminist arguments that see basic income as a way to address 
gender inequalities. But the desirability of a UBI remains contentious among feminists; some 
support it (Baker 2008 McKay 2005; Parker 1993; Sherwin and Piven 2019; Weeks 2011; 
Zelleke 2008; 2011) but others are critical (Bergmann 2004; Gheaus 2008; O’Reilly 2008; 
Robeyns 2001).2 Our study tackles questions about how a basic income can shape conflict in 
family life, women’s bargaining power within the family, and their ability to opt out of 
 
2 Feminists remain divided on the desirability of UBI-type policies and their effectiveness at promoting gender 
equality and justice. On one side of the debate are scholars who argue that a UBI could reduce societal biases that 
devalue care work (McKay 2001, 2005; Parker 1993), facilitate the de-gendering of care work and sharing of paid 
and unpaid work (Elgarte 2008, Zelleke 2008), and provide a means to economic independence beyond wage work 
(Zelleke 2011; Weeks 2011). One the other side of the debate are scholars who argue that a UBI would exacerbate 
the gender division of labor and reverse progress on gender equality in the labor market and in the public sphere 
more broadly (Robeyns, 2001; Gheaus 2008). These scholars also argue that a UBI is less effective than, and 
potentially incompatible with, other policies based on universal services (O’Reilly 2008; Bergmann 2004). Our 
paper does not aim to weigh in directly on this debate, which remains mostly speculative. We instead attempt to 
answer calls for more empirically based research (Robeyns 2008) to inform the political discussion. 
  
traditional family structures, but it does not address gender inequality concerning paid and 
unpaid work. 
Our framework borrows Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty—
designed originally to analyze the firm— to work out how the GAI can shift the equilibrium of 
family relations.3 Existing literature largely focuses on three key mechanisms when examining 
the relationship between income and family relations: the independence, bargaining and income 
effects. The independence effect says that income allows individuals to end relationships; the 
bargaining effect posits that income gives individuals more bargaining power within a 
relationship; and the income effect asserts that income reduces financial stressors. The standard 
language from economics tends to see each as a separate effect and research often focuses on 
whether one effect dominates the others (i.e., Bitler et al. 2004; Cain and Wissoker 1990a; 
Groeneveld et al. 1980). In contrast, Hirschman’s framework offers a template to think about the 
independence, bargaining, and income effects as part of an interrelated system that together 
shape the power dynamics and constraints that characterize different equilibria. The first two 
concepts—exit and voice—refer to options available to individuals who are unsatisfied with their 
relationship status quo; when people are unhappy in a relationship, they can either exit it or voice 
concerns about it. These two concepts are analogous to the independence and bargaining effects. 
The third concept—loyalty—refers to remaining in a relationship despite dissatisfactions. We use 
loyalty to broadly conceptualize the characteristics and conditions of those who remain in 
relationships, and we use income effects to incorporate the prediction that economic means 
improve marital relationships. In Hirschman’s framework each of these components shapes each 
other and the whole system: the possibility of exit is necessary for voice to have volume (i.e., 
serious complaints about a relationship will be harder to make if one is unable to end it), loyalty 
tends to encourage voice rather than exit (i.e., someone in a relationship will tend to talk through 
issues before separating and this might improve the relationship when successful). Thus, both 
 
3 Our adaptation of Hirschman’s concepts to family relations follows in part England and Kilbourne (1990) who 
used this framework to offer a theory about why husbands’ higher earnings turned into higher bargaining power.  
 
  
exit and voice are necessary to lower the costs of loyalty, or the level of dissatisfaction among 
those who remain in relationships. A change in structural constraints on exit and/or voice result 
in changes in the overall outputs of the system. When this theory is applied to the family, the 
structural changes in family economics can shift the constraints on romantic relationships. For 
instance, in a context where divorce is illegal or infeasible posing a structural constrain on exit, 
one’s voice to protest within a relationship is weaker. This could result in an equilibrium of 
unhappy marriages. When divorce is legal and genuinely feasible, partners will tend to voice 
their concerns to improve a relationship, and may exit when improvement is lacking. Here, exit 
and voice can facilitate a happier equilibrium. 
Following Hirschman, we propose that the GAI’s promise of economic security and 
independence can shift the structural economic constraints on exit and voice, thereby offering a 
foundation for happier and more equitable relationships. The fear of poverty is a major reason to 
not exit a relationship, particularly for women who have access to fewer economic resources than 
men. Women’s structural vulnerability to economic dependence can strip them of exit and voice, 
reinforcing male dominance within families. Poverty and economic uncertainty are also 
important sources of conflict, and continued conflict within a partnership can degrade the 
conditions that facilitate loyalty. A GAI can extend the availability of exit from low quality 
relationships, promote greater voice by diminishing women’s structural vulnerability to 
economic dependence, and support couples through bouts of economic uncertainty, ameliorating 
sources of conflict. Put differently, Mincome could provide a better foundation for loyalty, one 
based on relationship satisfaction and happiness rather than economic dependency or need.  
In this article, we study three types of relationship outcomes to empirically analyze this 
hypothesis. We study couple separations to determine how the GAI shapes exits, bargaining 
measures to determine how the GAI shapes voice, and conflict measures to determine how the 
GAI shapes marital satisfaction and quality. If the GAI offers a foundation for more equitable 
familial relations, we should find that independence effects—exits—are concentrated among 
unhappy partnerships. In parallel, we should find evidence for bargaining effects—that women’s 
  
voice increases. Moreover, we should find income effects—that conflict decreases as economic 
worries wane – and we should find declines in other marital conflicts too, either as a result of 
voice and/or income effects. Altogether, these predictions indicate that a basic income should 
lower the costs of loyalty, that is, improve relationship quality among those who remain married.  
We make our case using previously unused data from an understudied experiment called 
the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment, or Mincome. The Mincome experiment was a 
three-year (1975-1977) guaranteed annual income study conducted by the Canadian and 
Manitoba Governments in which participants were able to access a GAI equivalent of about 
$19,500 CDN (2014 dollars are used throughout) for a family of four. Mincome was designed as 
a negative income tax and payments were delivered to households rather than individuals, but all 
adults had an exit option in that they could separate and collect payments independently as 
single-person households. Collected data includes a household panel register that tracks couple 
separations during the experiment and a unique and newly digitized two-wave survey of married 
women that asked about shifting dynamics within the family. This is the first use of the married 
women’s survey data which in large part has remained undigitized until now. The survey was 
conducted by Mincome staff and occurs at a baseline and during the study period for both 
treatment and control groups. Crucially for our study, this survey includes direct measures of 
bargaining power and marital conflict. Our analyses use data from two sites using different 
experimental designs: (1) the Dauphin site, which used a “saturation” design where all residents 
were eligible for Mincome payments, and (2) the Winnipeg site, which used a randomized 
control trial design following prior U.S. income maintenance experiments.  
We find that Mincome did not lead to a disproportionate increase in divorce, but 
Mincome increased “divorce talk” among unhappy couples and lowered conflicts related to 
financial concerns. Additionally, we find that Mincome increased some expressions of wives’ 
bargaining power but had no effect on others. Taken together, our results provide some evidence 
consistent with the claim that a guaranteed income can offer a foundation for more equitable 
family relationships.  
  
 
ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND GENDERED FAMILY RELATIONS 
Economic resources play a central role in relationship dynamics. Money shapes who gets in and 
out of relationships as well as the quality of those relationships. An abused partner might feel 
unable to divorce due to insufficient means to set-up an independent home. A stay-at-home wife 
might be unhappy with her partner’s expenses on gambling and alcohol but feel powerless to 
change it. A third couple might have been happy and committed at first, but become unhappy 
after a bout of unemployment and poverty. These situations respectively correspond to the 
independence effect, the bargaining effect, and the income effect, representing the three 
approaches commonly used to understand how economic resources shape family life. 
The independence effect emerged from Becker’s theory of marriage, which argues that 
the gains to marriage are maximized when couples specialize and are mutually dependent, as in 
the breadwinner-housewife model (Becker 1974). Deviations from specialization and wives’ 
economic dependency reduce the gains to marriage relative to other options, like divorce or 
staying single. There is a vast literature on the economic independence effect related to increases 
in women’s employment, with overall mixed results (Sayer et al. 2011; Killewald 2016; for a 
review of previous literature, see Sayer and Bianchi 2000). The GAI’s effect is different from 
women’s employment because it increases women’s incomes without necessarily altering the 
pattern of specialization: a housewife might continue to specialize in home production after 
receiving a GAI but she is no longer entirely economically dependent on her husband. One of the 
concerns raised by feminist critics of basic income policies is in fact that they may reinforce the 
gendered division of labor by encouraging women to stay home (Gheaus 2008; Robeyns 2001). 
The independence effect expects a general increase in divorce as a result of the GAI: it 
posits that economic independence makes marriage relatively less appealing and divorce less 
costly (Bumpass 1990; Popenoe 1993). This expectation of exit from marriages fueled much of 
the controversy around GAI experiments mentioned in the introduction, although empirical 
research offered mixed results. Hannan et al. (1977) found evidence for the economic 
  
independence effect among families who participated in the Seattle and Denver Income-
Maintenance Experiments, finding that recipient couples were more likely to split up. Similarly, 
Hannan and Tuma (1990) showed that divorce was substantially higher for families with the 
guaranteed income than for the controls: 36 percent higher for blacks, and 40 percent higher for 
whites. By contrast, Cain and Wissoker (1990a, 1990b) used the same data and found that the 
guaranteed income had virtually no effect on dissolution at all.4 Hum and Choudhry (1992) used 
Mincome data from the dispersed Winnipeg sample and reported no significant results, although 
the directionality of their coefficient shows stabilizing effects at high and low payment levels and 
destabilizing effects at mid-level payments, lending no easy interpretation. Choudhry and Hum 
(1995) updated the analysis with the same data and showed no statistically significant differences 
between treatment and control groups, suggesting no “independence” effect.  
A more compelling interpretation of the independence effect takes the quality of a 
relationship into account. In this formulation, economic independence does not lower interest in 
marriage across the board, but provides a way out of “bad” marriages that individuals, mostly 
women, might enter into or stay in due to economic need (Cherlin 2000; Ruggles 1997; Schoen 
et al. 2002; Sayer et al. 2011). A guaranteed income means that women in unpleasant or 
potentially abusive relationships have the economic opportunity to move out and form new 
single-person households without fear of poverty if the guaranteed income is sufficiently 
generous as was the case with Mincome. This suggests that divorce might increase as a result of 
GAI, but for a good reason: because bad partnerships end. This can include cases of domestic 
abuse and violence, consistent with research indicating that positive changes in women’s socio-
 
4 The results from the experimental guaranteed income literature were fraught with controversy, particularly because 
studies used the same data and came to different conclusions. Discrepancies between these studies were most likely 
due to modeling decisions related to time-coverage, time-varying effects, and how to define treatment groups. For 
instance, Hannan and Tuma’s (1990) analyses did not include the last two experimental years of a five-year 
experiment, did not allow for time-varying effects, included inconsistent results (such as, more generous benefits 
leading to smaller effects than less generous benefits), and inappropriately defined the GAI treatment group as 
families receiving “training” as well as the GAI rather than the pure GAI group. Our own reading of these debates 
agrees with the skeptical side, we do not see sufficiently robust evidence to conclude that those basic income 
experiments increased marital dissolution. A discussion paper by Cain (1986) persuasively shows that findings about 
high levels of marital dissolution are very sensitive to modeling decisions.   
  
economic status may empower them to leave abusive relationships at earlier stages (Johnson 
2006; Bunge 2002; Dawson 2001; Dugan et al. 1999; Rosenfeld 1997).  
This interpretation of the independence effect equips us with two hypotheses concerning 
exit:  
H1a: Mincome couples will be at higher risk of separation than control couples because 
reduced economic dependence lowers the financial motivations for marriage. 
H1b: High-conflict Mincome couples will be at higher risk of separation than high-
conflict control couples because those caught in bad relationships will use Mincome to exit.  
 
 The bargaining effect also notes that independent economic resources provide an exit 
option to marriages, but asserts that economic resources can also be leveraged to change 
relationships and not just to exit them (Lundberg and Pollak 1994; 1996). The bargaining idea is 
that access to an economic alternative can increase one’s power to voice grievances, negotiate, 
and ultimately improve marital satisfaction. For housewives, independent access to sufficient 
economic resources means that one can convincingly threaten divorce as a bargaining device to 
demand changes inside a relationship (Lundberg and Pollak 1996). Thus, rather than simply 
making exits more likely, a GAI may affect the balance of power within relationships by making 
the threat of exit credible. The mechanism at the core of this hypothesis is power: the power to 
exit from a marriage may be present even if it is not exercised. The possibility of exit facilitates 
voice. Accordingly, we should expect that Mincome increases women’s bargaining power within 
relationships, which could manifest as an increased use of divorce threats or women pressing for 
greater decision-making power within the partnership. While Mincome payments were delivered 
to households rather than individuals, its effects on shifting bargaining dynamics would operate 
through the enhanced capacity to make a credible threat to leave (and collect Mincome payments 
independently as a single-person household), rather than an increase in women’s direct control of 
income. This is a question we return to in the discussion. Empirical studies examining the impact 
of economic resources on direct bargaining outcomes are rare, but literature on cash transfers to 
  
women in Latin America suggests that women’s decision-making power increases as their 
economic dependency decreases (i.e., Adato et al. 2000; De Brauw et al. 2014; Rubalcava et al. 
2009; for a review see Lomelí 2008). 
The bargaining effect expects Mincome to shift power relations within couples because it 
gives all women the exit option that facilitates voice. More specifically, we should observe that:  
H2a: Mincome women will be more likely to bargain with their partners relative to 
controls 
H2b: Mincome women will increase their decision-making power relative to controls 
 
 Lastly, the income effect sees increased resources as generally positive for familial 
relations. This is based on the theory that economic resources reduce financial instability, a 
perennial source of family conflict (Komarovsky 1971; Liker and Elder 1983). There is solid 
evidence showing that economic hardship and financial stress increase the risk of severe 
conflicts and domestic violence (Gelles 1997; Benson et al. 2003; Hardie and Lucas 2010; 
Golden et al. 2013; Schneider et al. 2016). Studies on divorce and separation have also 
repeatedly shown that couples are destabilized by lack of income (i.e. Brines and Joyner, 1999; 
Dechter, 1992; Kalmijn et al. 2007). In the GAI literature on divorce there is some support for an 
income effect, too. Hannan et al. (1978), for instance, found that that couples receiving the GAI, 
particularly those who received the more generous income support supplements, were less likely 
to split up.  
 The income effect expects Mincome to affect conflicts within families, insofar as 
economic insecurity is a major source of disagreement and can spill over to generate other 
conflicts and undermine the conditions of loyalty. In conjunction with the independence effect as 
high-conflict couples divorce, and the bargaining effect which provides new ways to resolve 
conflicts via voice, we hypothesize that:  
H3a: Mincome will reduce marital conflict related to finances relative to controls. 
H3b: Mincome will reduce marital conflict on other issues relative to controls.  
  
 
Altogether, conceptualizing the hypotheses on the independence, bargaining, and income 
effects as interrelated parts of a system indicates that the GAI can have notable effects on family 
relations by shifting structural constraints on exit and voice, as well as the costs associated with 
loyalty. With respect to likelihood of divorce, Mincome had simultaneously positive and 
negative effects. Our view suggests that the GAI will destabilize “bad” marriages, but stabilize 
“good” marriages. That is, Mincome should facilitate the threat of separation in marriages where 
divorce threat is appealing because the partnership is an unhappy one. By contrast, happier 
partnerships may use Mincome payments as a source of stability, ameliorating potential conflict 
rooted in economic hardship. The average effect on exit, therefore, will likely reflect these two 
patterns. Additionally, examining heterogeneity patterns by couples’ marital satisfaction before 
Mincome can shed more light on this point. Analyses of bargaining power and couple conflict 
measures will offer insight on how Mincome shapes relationship dynamics among couples who 
remain together. We expect Mincome to increase women’s bargaining power within 
relationships and to reduce conflicts. Overall, and contrary to suggestions that GAI might 
“undermine the family,” we see potential for the GAI to improve family relations by providing a 
way out of bad and abusive relationships, supporting families through economic uncertainty and 
hardship, and facilitating more egalitarian power relations.  
  
MINCOME 
Mincome was devised in response to a cluster of influential reports that publicized the extent and 
depth of poverty in Canada in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Economic Council of Canada 
(1968) and the Department of National Health and Welfare (1970) presented the guaranteed 
annual income as an intriguing idea meriting serious consideration and subsequent reports posed 
the GAI as the central policy solution of the era, an idea “whose time has come” (Canada 1971: 
175). Inspired directly by four similar experiments in the U.S., it was hoped that Mincome would 
demonstrate the feasibility of the guaranteed income to the Canadian public.  
  
The Mincome GAI experiment included two main sites: (1) a saturation site in Dauphin 
where all residents were eligible to receive the benefit; and (2) a randomized site in Winnipeg. 
The experiment was designed to last three years and the public was informed about the timeline; 
participants knew transfers would end three years after the experiment was launched. In the 
Dauphin saturation site participants were offered guaranteed incomes equivalent to $19,500 for a 
four-person household in 2014 Canadian dollars. Families with no labor market income could 
access the full guarantee, which was about 49 percent of the Dauphin’s median household 
income in 1976. Benefits were also available to people with incomes above the guarantee 
baseline. At a negative income tax rate of 50 percent, people could always increase their incomes 
by working: every dollar of labor market earnings reduced the guarantee by 50 cents, which 
meant that payments were phased out entirely once earnings reached $39,000. Positive tax 
liabilities were rebated too; the rebate faded to zero once market earnings reached around 
$43,400. For context, according to the 1971 census, real median household income for Dauphin 
(together with its rural municipality) was only $24,758 and by the middle of the experiment in 
1976, real median household income was $39,382. These figures illustrate the accessibility of 
benefits to a fairly broad group of residents. In Dauphin about 20 percent of the total population 
received Mincome benefits at some point throughout the program, having a notable impact on 
households’ incomes. In the Winnipeg site, assignment to the control and treatment groups was 
randomized and Mincome benefits operated similarly, but participants were divided into groups 
and assigned different treatment plans consisting of one of three guarantee levels ($19,500, 
$23,800, or $28,215) and one of three tax back rates (.35, .5, or .75).  
Guarantee levels varied by family size and composition in both experimental sites. They 
were, however, designed to be “neutral” with respect to marital separation (Hikel and Harvey 
1973; Hum, Laub, and Powell 1979), while accounting for variation of real needs across family 
size. Mincome attempted to design a payment structure that generated neither penalty nor benefit 
to splitting, and one that did not systematically favor any one household size. This meant taking 
average economies of scale in the home into account. In particular, since per-person housing 
  
costs decline with additional household members, so should per-person household guarantee 
levels. In practice this meant that a single person would receive 38 percent of the four-person 
standard, and a couple without children would receive 71 percent. For those without children, a 
couple living separately would receive, when combined, 107 percent of what they would receive 
living together. The expressed aim was to eliminate any strictly economic reasons to dissolve a 
marriage.  
Unlike previous experiments in the US, Mincome applied a broad research design based 
on a more holistic understanding of poverty and familial well-being. Additional variables related 
to issues of the family were included as well as surveys beyond those directly measuring 
separation. One unique survey, discussed in detail in the next section, was designed specifically 
to measure a broad range of outcomes with respect to the family—from power, decision-making, 
and the domestic division of labor, to various kinds of disagreement and harmony in the home. 
Unfortunately, Mincome was underfunded and instead of reducing incomes to households, the 
analysis part of Mincome was completely cut. No final report was produced, and most of the 
survey data collected on Dauphin has never been analyzed. After the conclusion of the Mincome 
experiment, a small number of journal articles were produced from the digitized Winnipeg data 
(Hum and Simpson 1991; 1993; Prescott et al. 1986; Hum and Choudhry 1992). Until recently 
however, no published research has examined the original survey records (Calnitsky 2016; 2018; 
Calnitsky and Latner 2017) or administrative health data (Forget 2011) from the Dauphin portion 
of the experiment.  
The Mincome experiment took place in a context of slowly expanding women’s rights in 
the family, large gender economic inequalities, and women’s near exclusive responsibility for 
unpaid care work. Divorce had been legal in the Prairie Provinces (which includes the province 
of Manitoba where Dauphin and Winnipeg are located) since 1870. By 1971 divorced adults 
represented 2 percent of the married population in Manitoba and 1.2 percent in Dauphin (Census 
data, authors’ analyses). Gender economic inequality was high, with only about 44 percent of 
adult women in the labor force and women’s average income at about 47 percent of men’s 
  
(Census data for Manitoba, authors’ analyses). A good share of women’s employment was likely 
part-time, as part-time employment represented about a third of women’s total employment 
nationwide (Ferrao 2010). Social policy was rapidly evolving at the time, with the introduction 
of major policies like the Canada Pension Plan (Guest 2003) or the Family Allowance Act 
(Blake 2009). While these policies offered support for families with caregiving responsibilities, 
they did not offer substitutes to family caregiving. In absence of social infrastructure for 
childcare or eldercare, the responsibility of caregiving was largely managed by women inside 
families. This context is useful in interpreting the analyses we present below and to grasp how 
and why patterns might differ if Mincome were implemented today; we will expand on those 




Mincome staff collected data on both control and treated households before and during the 
experiment. In our analyses we employed two data sources: (1) panel data on relationship status, 
and (2) a two-wave survey of married couples. The latter was recently recovered from the 
archives and is newly digitized; this is the first analysis using this survey data on all couples’ 
relationships during the experiment. The panel data on household status contains basic socio-
demographic information on all control and treatment households during Mincome from 1974 to 
1977, and tracks changes in relationship status and family composition. It includes 10 waves of 
data, beginning with a baseline survey in 1974, before the experiment, and was updated every 
four months during Mincome, between 1975 and 1977. 
 The two-wave survey of married couples was designed to collect information on 
domestic social relations and power dynamics in the family. It includes only two waves of data, 
one before and one during Mincome, in 1974 and 1976 respectively. Unlike the panel data on 
household status, the couple survey was not mandatory but many completed it; to limit refusals a 
payment equivalent to 25 current dollars per survey was offered to all respondents. Completed 
  
surveys account for about 70 percent of married program participants at the time of 
administration. Questionnaires were separately completed by husbands and wives, and we use 
wives’ answers only. The questions focus on various subjects, including the domestic division of 
labor; control over money; power and decision-making in the home; the frequency of 
disagreement over a variety of financial and non-financial issues, including money, purchases, 
work, and alcohol-use; the extent to which couples relate to one another in a harmonious, stress-
free, and mutually supportive fashion; the extent to which couples are happy with their 
relationship; and the extent to which couples have talked about separation or divorce. Analyses 
reported below use the balanced sample of couples who completed the survey before and during 
Mincome, which excludes attritors and those who split up during survey. The results are robust 
to use of the unbalanced sample.  
 We use panel data to analyze independence effects—the use of exit—and the two-wave 
couples survey data to analyze bargaining effects—the use of voice— and income effects, 
measured by the frequency of conflicts.  Taken together, these patterns determine the conditions 
and costs of loyalty between partners. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all dependent 
variables and the respondents’ socio-demographic background (for more details on sample size, 
attrition, and missing values in key variables see Tables S1-S2 in the Online Appendix). We 
report data for the total sample and for the two comparisons of interest, identified below as either 
Dauphin or Winnipeg treatment effects. The Dauphin treatment effect contrasts couples in 
Dauphin (the treatment saturation site) to Manitoba control couples; the Winnipeg treatment 
effect contrasts randomized treatment and control groups in Winnipeg. It is important to keep in 
mind that the identification of the Dauphin treatment effect is more vulnerable to unobserved 
heterogeneity effects than the Winnipeg treatment effect, because in Dauphin treatment was not 
randomized. In supplementary analyses, we tested the sensitivity of the Dauphin results by 
further adjusting the treatment and control sample using entropy balancing methods 
(Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013) and the results are not substantively different 
(see Online Appendix Figures S1-S4). We further discuss the limitations of these analyses in the 
  
discussion section. Descriptive statistics show that treatment and control samples are reasonably 
similar; the Winnipeg randomized design balances the treatment and control sample quite well, 
whereas the Dauphin saturation design means that treatment and control sample are not as 
similar, particularly with respect to wives’ age and husbands’ unemployment. Below we describe 
our measures to examine each of these treatment effects and analyze separation, bargaining 




We measure the independence effect in two ways: couple splits and “divorce talk”. The first 
dependent variable, actual couple splits, comes from the household status panel data, which 
tracks changes in relationship status in both treatment and control groups. We are able to discern 
the fate of all couples at the 1974 baseline and every four months between 1975 and 1977. A 
woman is defined as split when she no longer lives with her husband.  
The second dependent variable for separation captures risk via a measure of discussions 
of divorce, taken from a question in the couple survey that asks how often the couple talks about 
divorce. We use a scale ranging from 1 (“never”) to 4 (“often”). See Table 2 for survey question 
wording. Because most separations will not happen overnight and most couples will talk about 
divorce before splitting up, this measure of separation risk is a useful complement to the measure 
of actual separations. This measure could alternatively be read as an expression of wives’ 
divorce threats and bargaining power within the couple. We will consider this interpretation too, 
but, because the question as worded does not identify who initiates these discussions, we use it 
primarily as a measure of divorce risk and analyze wives’ bargaining power with other, more 
direct, measures.   
We measure the bargaining power effect using two measures: (a) reports of wives’ 
temporary break-ups, and (b) wives’ decision-making power.  
  
(a) Wives reports about initiating temporary break-ups from the household due to marital 
conflict; 1 = any temporary break-up, 0 = otherwise. See Table 2. 
(b) Wives’ power in decision-making is gauged by a series of questions posed in the couple 
survey about who should have authority over making decisions, who usually wins 
arguments in the couple, and how disagreements are typically resolved. We code 
responses as dummy variables, where 0 means the husband gets his way, and 1 means 
that either the wife has power or a compromise is found. See Table 2 for more details. 
Lastly, we test for income effects using measures that capture couples’ disagreements over 
finances and other related issues. We employ six items that explicitly deal with financial 
questions, including family expenditures and women’s work outside of the home (see Table 2 for 
full list). Respondents answered using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“always agree”) to 5 
(“always disagree”). We combined these items into an index using the average of the six items: 
the higher the index, the more financial disagreement. Cronbach’s alpha, a coefficient measuring 
scale reliability, is above 0.7, indicating that the items are sufficiently reliable to use in a single 
scale.  
We also constructed an additional scale to gauge disagreement in general. These 
questions from the survey are structured in the same way, asking about disagreement in areas 
including leisure and housework (see Table 2). We combine these using the steps described 




Our first analysis of the separation risk in the Mincome panel data uses a Kaplan-Meier survival 
function to estimate the chances of separation in both treatment and control groups. This method 
provides an effective test of different durations of “exposure” to the risk of marital dissolution 
across families—that is, the different amounts of time that families are in the study—and uses a 
“risk-set” calculated at every period to account for censored observations. The survival function 
  
provides estimates of the likelihood a couple will split after each given survey, conditional on 
having not separated up to the prior survey. 
The remainder of our analyses use difference-in-difference (DiD) models with individual-
level fixed-effects to test whether Mincome has an effect on the outcomes of interest (Angrist 
and Pischke 2009; Lechner et al. 2016). DiD estimates compare the change in the outcome 
variable before and after treatment in the treatment vs control groups. We compare the 1974-to-
1976 change in family outcomes of interest in the treatment group to the change in the control 
group over the same period. DiD estimates with balanced samples and two-survey waves are 
equivalent to first-differences models (Allison 2009). By adding individual-level fixed effects we 
leverage only within-unit variation, thus eliminating biases driven by stable and unobserved 
heterogeneity between units (e.g., fixed personality differences). DiD estimates are unbiased if 
the parallel trends assumption holds, that is, if change in the outcome variable would have been 
the same in the treatment and control group if treatment was absent. When data includes several 
pre-treatment observations it is possible to evaluate whether pre-treatment trends between the 
treatment and control group differ, but we are unable to do this because both of our datasets only 
include one pre-treatment observation. The potential bias arising from violating the parallel 
trends assumption is relatively greater in the Dauphin experimental site, because Winnipeg’s 
randomization should, in principle, eliminate pre-treatment differences. We further discuss the 
implications of this assumption below and in the Online Appendix. The standard DiD equation 
can be formalized as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Yit is the outcome variable at time t, M is a treatment dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the respondent receives Mincome, S identifies the study period, and Z captures the time-
varying covariates. 𝛽1 identifies pre-treatment differences between the treatment and control 
groups, 𝛽2 captures changes in the outcome variable for the control group, and 𝛽3 is the key 
estimate of interest capturing differences in the change of the outcome variable between the 
  
treatment and control group. We estimate this equation with individual fixed effects, which 
means that we do not estimate 𝛽1. Applied to the analysis on divorce talk, for instance, Yit is the 
frequency of divorce talk and β3 tests whether couples became more likely to talk about divorce 
when they received Mincome compared to couples in the control group. More specifically, it 
tests whether the change in couples’ divorce talk during Mincome was different from that of 
other similar couples who did not receive Mincome.  
 We analyze two experimental sites: (1) the Dauphin saturated site, where Dauphin 
residents receiving Mincome are the treatment group and residents across Manitoba who do not 
receive Mincome are the control group; and (2) the Winnipeg randomized site, where Winnipeg 
residents receiving Mincome are the treatment, and Winnipeg non-recipients are the control. We 
use the shorthand Dauphin treatment and Winnipeg treatment to refer to these two comparisons, 
respectively. Analyzing both experimental sites allows us to benchmark the estimates against one 
another and to evaluate different potential sources of variation between the two sites, including 
differences related to experimental design type (saturation vs randomization) as well as social 
context (rural vs urban). As noted above, the non-randomized design of the Dauphin experiment 
means that the parallel trends assumption might be violated in this case, meaning that 
participants in Dauphin might be selected on some unobserved characteristic resulting in 
systematically different trends from the control group. Our grounds for causal inference are 
relatively stronger in the Winnipeg treatment than in the Dauphin treatment; by providing results 




Did Mincome increase divorce, as pundits across the political spectrum professed in the 1970s? 
We examine this issue using micro-data on married couples, noting the number of actual splits in 
both treatment and control couples. We begin with the stock of all married couples and look at 
“survival rates” across the duration of the experiment. 
  
Figure 1 presents Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for Dauphin and Winnipeg contrasts, 
including treatment and control groups. In the Dauphin case, survival rates for treatment and 
control groups are very close at the start of the experiment, but once the program becomes more 
familiar by the third and fourth survey wave, a divergence emerges. The Mincome group has a 
higher chance of splitting early on in the experiment, when the sum total of the Mincome 
windfall is highest, suggesting some potential for an “independence” effect for women in the 
treatment group. This divergence narrows in the second half of the experiment as the end date 
comes into view. By contrast, in Winnipeg there is no discernable divergence at all. 
Overall there is little indication that Mincome led to actual splits, consistent with Hum 
and Choudhry (1992) and Choudhry and Hum (1995). The absolute number of splits and the 
relative percentage differences in splits between treatment and control groups are both quite 
small. While treatment effects in Dauphin appear discernable from survival estimates, a barrage 
of tests (Log-rank, Wilcoxon, Peto-Peto, and Tarone-Ware) of the null hypothesis shows no 
significant difference between groups. Because the Wilcoxon test gives most weight to variation 
early on, it is natural that its p-value is lowest, though even this result is far from significant. The 
divergence in split rates are so small that one cannot exclude the possibility that this is chance 
variation, and thus we gain no confidence that Mincome increased marital separation.  
<Fig. 1> 
When examining the independence effect, we fail to find evidence for H1a, that Mincome 
couples will be at higher risk of separation than control couples because reduced economic 
dependence lowers the gains to marriage. This null-effect could be due to an independence effect 
too small to detect. Or, if it is true that Mincome increased divorce among unhappy couples but 
reduced it among happy couples, these two effects may cancel each other out. It is also possible 
that design features of Mincome, in particular the fact that benefits were delivered to the 
household and were accessible to individuals who might want to separate only after they 
separated, makes divorce threats and acting on it less powerful than they otherwise would. We 
next look at divorce talk, as a measure of separation risk. 
  
Women in the treatment and control groups were asked whether the couple had talked 
about divorce or separation in the past several months. Figure 2 shows a substantial increase in 
divorce talk across both sites. Dauphin treatment results are in black, supplemented by Winnipeg 
treatment results in grey (see Table A2 for full results). In Dauphin the coefficient is 0.11 and 
statistically significant; in Winnipeg the coefficient is still positive but somewhat weaker and not 
significant. Because the result is only statistically significant in the Dauphin sample, we cannot 
conclude with certainty that there is a substantial increase in this measure of separation risk in 
the overall sample.  
However, we find that these discussions were concentrated among couples with low 
marital satisfaction. We used women’s pre-treatment assessment of marital disagreement and 
interacted “divorce talk” with a dichotomous variable identifying “high-disagreement” and “low-
disagreement” relationships. Figure 2 shows that the positive effect in the full sample is in fact 
due to a large and significant increase in divorce talk among “high-disagreement” couples in 
both samples. They move 0.58 of a Likert point in Dauphin, about 18 percent of all possible 
change of three points on a four-point scale. In Winnipeg too, we find a significant coefficient of 
0.53. 
<Fig. 2> 
Moreover, Figure 2 shows that “low-disagreement” couples might see a tiny effect or 
decline in divorce talk, although those coefficients are not statistically significant. In the 
Winnipeg sample the sign actually moves from positive to negative, though effects are non-
significant. It is worth noting that in light of “ceiling effects” there is little room for 
improvement. That is, with a constant close to 1, many women at the baseline enter the 
experiment already reporting “No, not at all”; they never talk about separation.  
This analysis of divorce talk provides some support for H1b, that high-conflict Mincome 
couples will be at higher risk of separation than high-conflict control couples because those 
caught in bad relationships will use Mincome to exit. It also suggests that Mincome does not 
seem to correlate with changes in divorce talk among low-conflict couples. The measure of 
  
divorce talk does not explicitly identify the wife as the initiator of divorce talk but could also be 
interpreted as an expression of wives’ divorce threats, in which case it would indicate that 
Mincome increases wives’ voice within high-conflict partnerships. 
 
Voice 
This section examines the potential for broader changes in power relations within marriages. 
Even if the exit option Mincome afforded to women did not directly lead to splits, perhaps it 
changed the power relations within the family affording women more bargaining power or 
decision-making power. We use data from a survey question about instances in which the wife 
left the home for a night as well as questions regarding wives’ decision-making power on a range 
of issues to examine H2a and H2b—that Mincome women will be more likely to bargain with 
their partners relative to controls and Mincome women will increase their decision-making 
power relative to controls. 
Married women were asked whether they left home, even if only for a night. If Mincome 
increased wives’ capacity to bargain, we should observe an increase in wives’ temporary break-
ups among Mincome couples. Results in Figure 3 provide some support for this idea in the 
Dauphin sample. Wives’ in Dauphin became more likely to temporarily break-up with their 
partners than their control peers. While the Dauphin effect is significant, in Winnipeg the effect 
is non-significant. We interpret this result as weak support for hypothesis H2a.  
We now turn to more general measures of domestic power. Here, we examine potential 
changes in decision-making power over important aspects of domestic life, asking who tends to 
make key decisions, who wins out in decision-making, and who gives in when there is 
disagreement. To what extent do we find direct evidence for changing power relations? 
 Figure 3 displays the experimental effects of three survey questions on power and 
decision-making. Positive coefficients indicate that the wife’s power increases. The first question 
asks who should make final decisions about the wife’s job. The model estimates the changing 
likelihood that either she should make the final decision or that the decision should be mutually 
  
decided upon, relative to the base outcome that the husband should make the final decision. 
Results show small and non-significant declines in the husband deciding in both Dauphin and 
Winnipeg groups. 
The second question asks about who wins when there is a “really important decision” on 
which partners disagree. Our model estimates the changing likelihood that women usually win 
out, that decisions are mutual, that neither wins out, or that both sometimes win, relative to the 
base outcome that the husband usually wins out. Results here are extremely small and non-
significant in both groups. 
<Fig. 3> 
A third question asks about who tends to give in and who gets their way on an issue that 
causes the most disagreement between partners. Our model compares the baseline category “my 
husband ends up getting his way” to all other outcomes, and the coefficients show positive 
increases toward other outcomes but the effect sizes are very small and non-significant.  
Overall, the evidence that wives’ bargaining power and decision-making improved is very weak. 
We find some evidence consistent with increases in exercising strong bargaining via temporary 
break-ups (as measured by divorce talk and reports of the wife leaving for a night or so) in 
Dauphin, but not in Winnipeg. There is no evidence for other, more general indicators of 
changing power relations in Dauphin nor Winnipeg. One interpretation of the difference between 
the Dauphin and Winnipeg result on temporary breakups is that the Dauphin sample is more 
negatively selected on marital quality. Another possibility is that Dauphin residents’ responses 
are shaped by community-level effects as well as individual-level effects, that is, it is possible 
that their outcomes also reflect the fact that their neighbors are receiving Mincome too or at least 
are eligible to receive it. The available data does not allow us to further disentangle between 
these two possibilities. In sum, the results suggest weak support for H2a and no support for H2b. 
While Mincome destabilizes “bad” marriages, Mincome may or may not play a role in changing 




Lastly, we turn to the idea that Mincome might improve relationships by reducing financial 
conflict and disagreement through the “income effect.” We also consider the possibility that 
Mincome might reduce marital conflicts more generally due to spill-over effects, exits of low-
quality couples, and voice empowerment. Drawing on Hirschman’s framework, our expectation 
is that Mincome might reduce the costs of loyalty, or the level of dissatisfaction among those 
who remain in relationships. Evidence for the income effect would also support the idea that the 
null result in the separation analysis is likely due to two effects cancelling each other out: 
Mincome increasing the risk of divorce among poor-quality couples but reducing it among other 
couples by reducing conflict due to financial stress.  
We find evidence in survey responses from married women to support H3a, that 
Mincome will reduce marital conflict related to finances relative to controls, but find weaker 
statistically significant trends to support H3b, that Mincome will reduce marital conflict on other 
issues relative to controls. Figure 4 reports the key coefficient of interest from fixed-effects 
regressions on measures of financial stress and disagreement (see Table A2 for full results); in 
the top panes, the dependent variables are financial and non-financial disagreement scales, and in 
the bottom panes the dependent variables are specific items from these respective scales. The 
results for the financial disagreement index show a statistically significant change of -0.15 Likert 
points in Dauphin. On a 5-point Likert scale, with a maximum movement of four possible points, 
this fall in disagreement translates to 3.7 percent of all possible change. It is worth noting here 
that the constant, at 2.15, implies that there is already a good amount of agreement (1 = Always 
Agree), and therefore little room for improvement in agreement. In the Winnipeg case we find a 
similar significant coefficient (-0.17). On the scale of non-financial disagreement, however, 
while both Dauphin and Winnipeg coefficients are negative and of similar magnitude, they 
narrowly fall short of statistical significance.  
<Fig. 4> 
  
When examining the financial disagreement scale in more detail, we find that coefficients 
for individual items are generally negative and similar in size but not always statistically 
significant. Regarding the question on financial disagreement related to whether respondents 
have enough money to meet family needs, Dauphin shows a negative non-statistically coefficient 
of -0.1 and Winnipeg shows a very large and statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.33 
as shown in the middle-left pane. On the item concerning disagreement on whether to spend or 
save money, shown in the bottom-left pane; we find a non-significant change of -0.10 points in 
Dauphin, or a fall of about 4.5 percent of all possible change. Winnipeg shows an even larger 
and statistically significant coefficient at -0.33. In general these findings support the hypothesis 
that Mincome reduces financial stress and financial disagreement.  
We can also pull apart our findings on non-financial disagreement. While the non-
financial disagreement index is not significant overall, two items in the index stand out. As 
shown in the middle-right pane, wives were asked about disagreement related to their husband’s 
habits, including drinking, and on that issue we find a statistically-significant coefficient of -0.25 
points in Dauphin, or 6.3 percent of all possible change. That is, Dauphin wives, compared with 
control subjects, saw a large and statistically significant fall in alcohol-related disagreement. The 
equivalent figure in Winnipeg also shows a moderately negative coefficient at -0.1 that is not 
statistically significant. The question on disagreement about husband’s choice of friends shows 
large negative coefficients in Dauphin (-0.17) and Winnipeg (-0.29), but is only significant in the 
latter. Based on these results, it is plausible to conclude that reductions in financial stressors 
translate into reductions in various types of disagreement providing some support for H3b. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper returns to the Mincome experiment of the 1970s and re-examines the hotly debated 
issue of the guaranteed income and family relations. It shifts the debate—away from a blinkered 
focus on the calamity of divorce and the “undermining of the family”—to consider the 
possibility that income maintenance might offer a foundation for more equitable and happier 
  
familial relationships. We broaden the scope of previous research and analyze three dimensions 
of family life: separation, bargaining power, and marital conflict. By drawing Hirschman into the 
family context, we offer an encompassing framework that conceptualizes the independence, 
bargaining, and income effects as part of an interrelated system that together shape the power 
dynamics and constraints that characterize different (marital) relationships equilibria. Overall, 
our results speak in favor of the view that the guaranteed income shifts the economic foundations 
of family relations in ways that could encourage more equitable family lives.   
 We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that Mincome impacted different 
families differently, strengthening familial bonds in some, but undermining them in already 
unhappy relationships. This ancillary finding is a kind of threshold effect: we show that 
Mincome destabilizes high-disagreement but not low-disagreement marriages. The idea that 
Mincome destabilizes “bad” relationships and has little effect on “good” ones is highly 
suggestive, and consistent with the conditional version of the independence effect and the 
income effect. For example, the second half of the finding—having little effect on good 
marriages—dovetails with our finding of reductions in financial stress and conflict. The first 
half—destabilizing bad marriages—is reflected in separations and divorce talk, but is too small 
to impact the overall divorce risk. Our results are consistent with previous studies finding null or 
very small and contextual divorce effects associated with other guaranteed income experiments 
(Cain and Wissoker 1990a, 1990b; Hum and Choudhry 1992; Choudry and Hum 1995), and thus 
adds to the skepticism about the validity of other studies that report widespread and large 
increases in divorce (Hannan et al. 1977; Hannan and Tuma 1990). 
Results yield limited support for the idea that the GAI increases wives’ voice. Results 
from the Dauphin sample suggest that wives may gain bargaining power as measured by 
initiations of temporary break-ups and also measured by divorce talk – assuming women initiate 
most of these conversations as research suggests (Sayer et al. 2011) – but the results from the 
Winnipeg sample are not statistically significant. Results on other decision-making power 
measures are not statistically significant in either sample. This null result could be due to couples 
  
experiencing increases in bargaining power being more likely to split up and leave the sample. 
While this is a possibility that we cannot entirely rule out, supplementary analyses comparing 
pre-treatment differences between couples who remain together, split, or attrite do not support 
this interpretation (see Online Appendix discussion and Tables S5-S6). The null-results on 
bargaining measures might instead be due to the fact that, while the guaranteed income makes 
exit credible, it does not eliminate unequal gendered power dynamics within families. It is also 
possible that this non-finding comes down to a basic design feature, one that distinguishes a 
Mincome-style guaranteed annual income from the universal basic income; the latter is 
distributed to all individuals and the former is allocated at the level of the household. It is 
certainly conceivable for the guaranteed annual income to facilitate someone’s exit from a 
household. Forming a single-person household and collecting payments individually was an 
available option for women under Mincome; some took that option, and others surely considered 
it. However, the universal basic income is automatically directed to individuals, not households. 
This means that it not only provides an exit option, it also provides resources—and therefore 
power—immediately to individuals in the midst of relationships characterized by unequal power 
dynamics. Allocation to individuals rather than families diminishes the risk that the more 
powerful party takes control of payments. It stands to reason that relative to the guaranteed 
income, a universal basic income (or a guaranteed income distributed to individuals rather than 
families) may be even more likely to generate changes in gender power relations in family life. 
This interpretation is conditional on all else remaining equal, in particular the division of labor. If 
basic income encourages other changes in family life that exacerbate women’s specialization on 
unpaid housework and care work, the net overall change on women’s bargaining power is 
unclear. A basic income might succeed at providing a more universal access to exit (meaning less 
dependence on markets and less incompatibility between market and care demands), but it could 
simultaneously discourage women’s advances in the labor market (Robeyns 2001; Gheaus 2008). 
The design of the basic income benefit and characteristics about the context (availability of 
public services for childcare and eldercare, women’s economic position, and gender norms) 
  
might importantly moderate which effect dominates. If this moderating effect is present, it ought 
to be noted that it was likely far stronger in the context of the 1970s when gender wage gaps 
were higher than today; correspondingly, the probability that basic income stimulates a return of 
female domesticity seems lower today.       
 Next, it is worth considering the differences between the Dauphin and Winnipeg 
outcomes. There are four potential reasons why slight differences in effect sizes are present. 
First, selection effects mean that Dauphin participants—as in a real-world guaranteed income—
chose to join, where Winnipeg participants had randomized participation. The specific selection 
effect in this case is not obvious. It is possible that low-quality marriages would be more likely to 
join the experiment in Dauphin relative to Winnipeg and that this biases our Dauphin results, but 
because the experiment delivered payments to households as opposed to individuals this 
possibility is less straightforward. Furthermore, the signs and statistical significance test of 
treatment coefficients are consistent in the majority of analyses, and the signs of treatment 
coefficients are consistent in nearly all analyses, providing little indication of strong systematic 
differences between the two experimental sites due to selection. Second, it is possible that these 
differences capture real-world differences in how Mincome shapes family relationships in urban 
vs rural contexts; Dauphin is a more rural community and the familial dynamics might be 
different. Third, community effects are present in Dauphin, but not Winnipeg. Because Dauphin 
participants are surrounded by neighbors who might also be participants, there is the potential 
that people’s decisions might be impacted not only by the program directly, but also by the 
actions of other participants (see Calnitsky and Latner 2017). Fourth, the payment amount and 
tax-back rates in Winnipeg included packages that were more generous than in Dauphin. Despite 
these differences, the results are almost always consistent, suggesting that differences in the 
experimental circumstances did not impact the overall narrative. 
The lessons gleaned from the guaranteed income experiments of the 1970s are relevant to 
the basic income debate today, particularly given the very limited amount of empirical research 
on family and gender outcomes (Cantillon and McLean 2016; Robeyns 2008). However, is it 
  
worth asking: haven’t transformations in the structure of women’s work opportunities already 
changed the shape of domination and economic dependency in families? It is true that 
relationships have changed over time and women’s employment has increased. In fact, one of the 
key factors behind declines in domestic abuse was the expansion of viable alternatives to 
domesticity (Kalmuss 1984; Pollak 2005); the expansion of labor market opportunities for 
women had emancipatory effects precisely because it provided an exit option from traditional 
patterns of economic dependence on male breadwinners (England and Kilbourne 1990). Basic 
income does just this, but arguably in a far more direct manner. It is more effective than job 
growth because it is not contingent on the vicissitudes of the market (Weeks 2011) and it is 
compatible with caregiving demands (Zelleke 2011), which continue to be a primary reason why 
women become economically dependent on male partners (Goldin and Mitchell 2017; Musick et 
al. 2020). Thus, although changes in social context might have shifted who and how people 
would use a basic income to consider exit, increase their voice, or help quality loyalty, we believe 
the fundamental logic of the relationships identified in this study ought to shape our priors.  
A continued debate on the guaranteed or basic income is also critical in light of 
increasing precarity and informality in employment. With widespread uncertainty about the 
future of job growth, women in particular will likely continue to bear the costs of structural 
incompatibilities between full-time employment and caregiving. And in a period marked by new 
sources of economic insecurity (Kalleberg 2009; 2018), there is good reason to think that 
financial stress and conflict will continue to be a pervasive social reality. Reducing the sense of 
insecurity over finances through an automatic and regular stream of cash income will very likely 
serve to stabilize people’s everyday lives and temper a key site of conflict in relationships 
(Cherlin 2014). In this way, a meaningful source of financial stability in an era characterized by 
real uncertainties may prove to be more relevant than ever. 
This article argues that a guaranteed or basic income has the potential to offer an 
economic foundation for more equitable family relations that could have further reaching 
implications as well. For instance, women’s economic power might improve as family dynamics 
  
currently play an important role in structuring women’s disadvantage in the labor market. 
Women’s exposure to violence, in particular domestic violence, could also decline as many 
instances of violence are facilitated by economic dependency. A related paper (Calnitsky and 
Gonalons-Pons 2018) finds a strong negative association between Mincome and violent crime, 
which very likely stems from declines in domestic violence. These results are consistent with 
feminists who view basic income as a useful tool to obstruct some sources of structural gender 
inequality (Weeks 2011; Zelleke 201; McKay 2005). But our data does not speak to one of the 
thorny points of debate—whether a basic income would reinforce the gender division of labor 
and norms about women’s caregiving obligations (Gheaus 2008; Robeyns 2001). As noted 
above, our optimistic interpretation of these results relies on the assumption that all else remains 
equal, or ceteris paribus; in particular, that a basic income does not simultaneously incentivize 
regressive changes in the division of labor which remain unmeasured in this study. We also do 
not address important questions about the relative effectiveness of basic income compared to 
alternatives, such as universal services (Bergman 2004; 2008; O’Reilly 2008). Our study does 
not provide definitive answers, nor does it intend to defend one side against the other; we believe 
that there are good arguments on both the optimistic and cautious sides of the debate. Our article 
contributes to the growing body of empirically based research on basic income and seeks to help 
inform political discussion. Future feminist research ought to analyze the full spectrum of 
questions related to housework, caregiving, and employment across contexts to evaluate how 
basic income policies can shape gender equality and justice more broadly.  
Families are locations of love, but also of domination, abuse, and violence, and the 
economic structure on which they rest will foster one or another type of relationship. Our goal is 
to offer a framework that broadens sociological thinking around transformative social policy in 
family life and provides empirical evidence for its application. Early debate about the guaranteed 
income and the family was myopic in its fixation on divorce, framing separation as uniformly 
bad, and indeed, seemingly the only harm a family might suffer. But, as we know, unhappy 
families can be unhappy in a myriad of ways. Blind loyalty and barred exits formed the bedrock 
  
of an older, unhappy equilibrium. A new model of partnership can reconfigure family dynamics 
into a happy one. If loyalty in family life has value, it is only when exit and voice are also 
available. Basic income may offer some of the tools to assemble a happy equilibrium. Achieving 
it will require more than only finances, but a solid base of economic security is surely a 
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FIGURES AND TABLES  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Treatment and Control Samples 
 
  Total sample   Dauphin site   Winnipeg site 
  Range 
Sample 
means   
Control (2) Treatment   Control Treatment 
         
Household panel         
Separation  0 - 1  0.09  0.08 0.11  0.10 0.09 
Wives' age 15-64 32.34  32.11 37.73  31.00 29.83 
Husbands' age 18-72 35.85  35.18 42.23  33.73 33.25 
Has young kid <6  0 - 1  0.60  0.62 0.40  0.67 0.68 
Wives' high school  0 - 1  0.32  0.33 0.24  0.35 0.36 
Wives' employment  0 - 1  0.33  0.38 0.22  0.38 0.34 
Husbands' employment  0 - 1  0.89  0.93 0.80  0.94 0.91 
         
N (married couples)  964  276 250  218 385 
         
Two-wave couples survey         
Divorce talk 1 - 4 1.15  1.17 1.08  1.17 1.17 
Wife left for one night  0 - 1  0.08  0.08 0.04  0.07 0.10 
Who should decide about her job?  0 - 1  0.31  0.36 0.21  0.35 0.32 
When there is an important decision, who 
wins out?  0 - 1  0.87  0.84 0.90  0.86 0.87 
When there are disagreements, who gets their 
way?  0 - 1  0.92  0.93 0.90  0.92 0.92 
Financial disagreement index  1 - 5 2.13  2.18 2.11  2.20 2.14 
Nonfinancial disagreement index 1 - 5 2.23  2.28 2.17  2.30 2.25 
         
N (married couples)   443 (1)   144 100   107 199 
Notes: (1) 443 represents 68% of eligible married couples at the time of the second couple survey; 641 couples (2) Dauphin's control group includes Manitoba and 
Winnipeg controls.  





Table 2. Survey Questions, Answers, and Coding Scheme 
 
Variables Survey questions Answers Coding scheme 
Divorce talk 
frequency 
In the last several months have you and your husband ever 
talked about separating or getting a divorce 
Yes, often; Yes, occasionally; 
Yes, once or twice; No, not at al 
1 = never, 4 = often  
Wives' 
temporary      
break-ups 
In the last year, have you ever been so upset or discouraged 
that you left home and went to stay somewhere else for a little 
while...even if only for a day or so 
Yes/No 0 = no; 1= yes  
Bargaining 
power 
In every family couples have different ways of deciding 
things…people have ideas about how decisions should be 
made and who should make them. How do you feel each of the 
following decisions should be made by a family... Who should 
make the final decision about what job you should take? 
Husband should always decide; 
Husband and wife should 
decide together; Wife should 
always decide 
0 = husband should 
always decide; 1 = all 
other answers 
When there’s a really important decision on which you and 
your husband are likely to disagree, who usually wins out?  
I usually win; My husband 
usually wins; Neither of us win, 
we drop the subject; 
Sometimes I do, sometimes my 
husband does; Decisions are 
mutual 
0 = my husband usually 
wins; 1 = all other 
answers 
Now think about one thing that causes the most disagreement 
between you and your husband. How would you say this 
disagreement usually gets dealt with? 
I end up having things my way; 
My husband ends up having 
things his way; Neither of us 
gives in; We just eventually 
drop the subject; Sometimes he 
gives in, and sometimes I do; 
We each give in a little to the 
other 
0 = my husband ends up 
having things his way; 1 = 
all other answers 
Financial 
disagreement 
To what extent have you and your husband disagreed about 
each of these financial areas of family life in the last several 
months? 
5-point likert scale: 1= always 
agree, 5 = always disagree 
Index variable using the 
average of the six items, 1 
= always agreeing on all 
items to 5 = always 
disagreeing on all items.  
(1) whether the money you have is enough to meet your 
family’s needs 
(2) how your husband spends money 
(3) how you personally spend money 
(4) your working outside the home 
(5) whether to save or spend  
(6) the purchase of alcohol 
Non-financial 
disagreement 
To what extent have you and your husband disagreed about 
each of these financial areas of family life in the last several 
months? 
5-point likert scale: 1= always 
agree, 5 = always disagree 
Index variable using the 
average of the six items, 1 
= always agreeing on all 
items to 5 = always 
disagreeing on all items. 
(1) how much leisure time you spend together 
(2) the amount of affection you show for each other 
(3) how you get along with relatives 
(4) helping with work around the house 
(5) you or your husband’s personal habits, e.g. dress, 
cleanliness, drinking, smoking, etc. 
(6) religious beliefs 
(7) you or your husband’s choice of friends  
  
Notes: In sensitivity analyses we also constructed an alternative version using a binary variable where any report of disagreement on any of 
the six items set the variable to 1 and 0 if only agreement is reported. Results are robust to this alternative specification, available upon 
request 















































Figure 3. Examining Voice. Coefficient Plot for Mincome Effect on Bargaining and Decision-
Making Measures 
 





















Figure 4. Examining the Costs of Loyalty. Coefficient Plot for Mincome Effect on Financial 















Table A1. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Bargaining and Decision-Making Measures 
 
  Indicators of divorce threat   Wives' decision-making power (1) 
  Wife left for a night Frequency of divorce talk  





Who should make 
the final decision 
about your job 
 D W D W D W  D W D W D W 
                           
Treatment effect (β3) 0.0784* -0.0199 0.112* 0.0536 0.0311 -0.0416  -0.0146 0.00232 0.0248 0.0114 -0.0712 
-
0.00958 
 (0.0415) (0.0444) (0.0666) (0.0659) (0.0705) (0.0711)  (0.0479) (0.0515) (0.0436) -0.0439 (0.0911) (0.0776) 
Treatment 
effect#highdisagreement     0.546*** 0.567***        
     (0.193) (0.174)        
Constant 0.0736*** 0.117*** 1.122*** 1.161*** 1.124*** 1.160***  0.870*** 0.854*** 0.926*** 0.945*** 2.466*** 2.569*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0232) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0220)  (0.0166) (0.0175) (0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0317) (0.0265) 
              
Observations 467 582 475 588 475 588  476 590 455 565 471 589 
R-squared 0.018 0.024 0.013 0.005 0.057 0.042  0.001 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.005 
N 244 305 244 305 244 305   243 303 242 301 243 305 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             










Table 2. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Financial and Non-Financial Disagreement 
 
  Financial disagreement   Nonfinancial disagreement 
 Index 
Item 1: Enough 
money to meet 
needs? 
Item 2: Whether to 
save or spend 
 Index 
Item 1: Husband's 
habits and drinking 
Item 2: Husband's 
choice of friends 
  D W D W D W   D W D W D W 
              
Treatment effect 
(β3) -0.148* -0.171** -0.0980 -0.331** -0.181 -0.275**  -0.118 -0.114 -0.250* -0.0957 -0.172 -0.293** 
 (0.0883) (0.0799) (0.147) (0.136) (0.130) (0.120)  (0.0723) (0.0694) (0.132) (0.125) (0.117) (0.117) 
Constant 2.151*** 2.170*** 2.333*** 2.384*** 1.957*** 1.989***  2.207*** 2.281*** 2.386*** 2.424*** 2.039*** 2.223*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0272) (0.0510) (0.0462) (0.0451) (0.0407)  (0.0251) (0.0236) (0.0453) (0.0424) (0.0405) (0.0396) 
              
Observations 477 589 472 581 471 584  482 594 474 591 477 590 
R-squared 0.016 0.017 0.006 0.031 0.014 0.031  0.014 0.010 0.016 0.004 0.014 0.028 
N 243 305 243 304 243 305   244 305 242 305 242 304 
Standard errors in 
parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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